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MAKING MOMMIES: THE WASHINGTON STATE
COURT OF APPEALS EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY BY
CREATING A COMMON LAW PARENTAGE ACTION IN
IN RE PARENTA GE OF L.B.
Thomas G. Robinson-O'Neill
Abstract: In In re Parentage of L.B., Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals
created a new common law cause of action that allows a same-sex de facto parent to be
declared a legal parent. In the alternative, the court held that a de facto parent has a cause of
action under Washington's nonparental visitation statute. This Note argues that the court
exceeded its authority in creating a common law cause of action because the Uniform
Parentage Act and the statutory scheme preempt the common law. Further, this Note argues
that the ability of a de facto parent to obtain a visitation order under the nonparental visitation
statute adequately protects the best interests of the child. Therefore, the Washington State
Supreme Court should reverse Division l's creation of a common law parentage action and
affirm Division l's alternative holding.
Courts today must address an increasingly familiar family framework:
a lesbian couple who has a child via artificial insemination.' In most
cases, one of the women is the child's biological, and therefore legal,
parent; courts recognize her as the child's parent, and the legal system
protects her relationship with the child.2 The other woman may be able
to demonstrate that she is a "de facto parent' 3 who acts in every way as
1. Numerous cases around the country have similar fact patterns. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah
Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian
Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341, 342 (2002) (estimating that as many as ten million children live
with same-sex parents in the United States). See generally Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Child
Custody and Visitation Rights Arising from Same-Sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R.5th 1 (2000).
2. See Jacobs, supra note 1, at 342 (citing generally Julie Shapiro, De Facto Parents and the
Unfulfilled Promise of the New ALl Principles, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 769 (1999)).
3. For purposes of clarity, this Note will use the term "de facto parent" to describe a nonparent
with a psychological relationship with a child equivalent to that of a biological parent. See In re
Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash. App. 637, 648, 626 P.2d 16, 23 (1981). Case law from Washington
and other jurisdictions addresses these people also as "psychological parents" and as those acting in
loco parentis. See, e.g., In re Dependency of J.H., 117 Wash. 2d 460, 469, 815 P.2d 1380, 1384
(1991) ("In certain limited circumstances our appellate courts have recognized the importance of
psychological parents to the welfare of children."); In re Custody of S.H.B., 118 Wash. App. 71, 79,
74 P.3d 674, 680 (2003) ("Nonparents-including adoptive parents, legal guardians, grandparents,
and persons acting in an in loco parentis capacity-do not have the same constitutional rights of a
parent, absent legislative action."). See generally Miller, supra note 1 (citing cases addressing de
facto parents, psychological parents, and those acting in loco parentis). The various terms used by
different jurisdictions refer to those who have a significant psychological relationship with children.
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the child's parent but remains a legal stranger.4 However, if the womens'
relationship dissolves, the distinction between legal and de facto parents
means that the law protects only the legal parent's relationship with the
child.5
In Washington, until In re Parentage of L.B.,6 a de facto parent had
limited legal recourse to maintain a relationship with the child.7
However, in In re Parentage of L.B., Division I of the Washington State
Court of Appeals created a common law parentage action that allows a
nonbiological de facto parent standing to be declared a legal parent when
he or she can show that (1) the nonbiological parent consented to the
formation of a parent-like relationship; (2) the nonbiological parent lived
in the same household with the child; (3) the nonbiological parent
assumed the obligations of parenthood without expectation of financial
compensation; and (4) the nonbiological parent had been in a parental
role long enough to form a bonded psychological relationship with the
child.8
This Note argues that Division I of the Washington State Court of
Appeals (Division I) erred in recognizing a new common law parentage
action. Although Washington courts have the authority to create
common law, statutes and judicial caution limit this authority. 9 Because
the legislature intended the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) 10 to serve as
the exclusive means to determine parentage and because there are other
statutory remedies for de facto parents, Division I exceeded its authority
in creating a common law cause of action.11 Part I describes how, prior
The term de facto parent better describes the situation in which the person with the psychological
relationship is not the legal parent.
4. See Jacobs, supra note 1, at 342 (noting that the de facto parent had "no legal parental role
because of her lack of biological connection to the child").
5. See id. at 347 (noting that the law often fails to recognize a lesbian coparent's parental status).
6. 121 Wash. App. 460, 89 P.3d 271 (2004).
7. See, e.g., id. at 470-76, 89 P.3d at 276-79 (discussing statutory remedies for same-sex de facto
parents); see also infra Part I.
8. L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 487, 89 P.3d at 285.
9. See, e.g., Sedlacek v. Hillis, 145 Wash. 2d 379, 390, 36 P.3d 1014, 1019-20 (2001) (indicating
that the court will not extend the common law tort of wrongful discharge absent a clear mandate of
public policy); State ex rel. Madden v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 83 Wash. 2d 219, 222, 517 P.2d 585,
587 (1974) (stating that common law is preempted by statute where statute is plain and
unambiguous); L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 476, 89 P.3d at 279 (announcing the test for creating
common law).
10. The Uniform Parentage Act is codified in Washington at WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26 (2002).




to In re Parentage of L.B., same-sex de facto parents could not be
considered legal parents under the UPA. Part II addresses the remedies
de facto parents had prior to Division I's decision. Part III describes
judicial authority to create common law. Part IV presents the court's
reasoning in In re Parentage of L.B. Part V argues that Division I
exceeded its authority in creating a common law cause of action. This
Note concludes that Division I should have held that de facto parents
may obtain visitation orders under the nonparental visitation statute but
should not be declared legal parents under the common law.
I. UNDER THE UPA, THE SAME-SEX PARTNER OF A
BIOLOGICAL PARENT IS NOT A LEGAL PARENT
Courts do not typically consider the same-sex partner of a biological
parent to be the child's legal parent. 12 At common law, legal parents
were traditionally the biological mother and father. 13 Before the advent
of genetic testing, the difficulty of conclusively establishing biological
relationships between fathers and children led to a common law
presumption that spouses were the biological, and therefore the legal,
parents. 4 Because same-sex couples cannot marry in Washington,
15
those who have children via artificial insemination do not fit neatly into
this framework, as typically one of them is a biological parent and the
other is not.' 6 The nonbiological or de facto parent may establish
parentage by a statutory second parent adoption 7 or an adjudication of
parentage under the UPA.1
8
The same-sex partner of a biological parent may pursue a second
parent adoption.' 9 Adoption proceedings are purely statutory2 and allow
12. See Jacobs, supra note 1, at 343-44.
13. See State ex rel. D.R.M. v. Wood, 109 Wash. App. 182, 189, 34 P.3d 887, 891 (2001).
14. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989) (discussing common law
presumption of legitimacy).
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020(1) (2002) ("Marriages... are prohibited: ... [w]hen the
parties are persons other than a male and a female."). Two separate Washington State Superior
Courts recently declared this statute unconstitutional, but the decisions are stayed pending review by
the Washington State Supreme Court. Tracy Johnson, 2nd Judge Rules Against State's Gay
Marriage Ban, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 8, 2004, at Al. If the decision is upheld, a
lesbian married couple who conceives via artificial insemination will be covered by the UPA.
16. See Jacobs, supra note 1, at 342.
17. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.140-.295; D.R.M., 109 Wash. App. at 191, 34 P.3d at 892.
18. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.
19. D.R.M., 109 Wash. App. at 189, 34 P.3d at 891 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33). This Note
focuses on post-dissolution remedies for a de facto parent, because in most of these situations a
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a court to declare that a person not biologically related to the child is a
legal parent.2' The adoption statute is silent on the subject of second
parent adoptions,2 2 but the Washington State Supreme Court has held
that the standing requirements for adoption are very broad. Division I
of the Washington State Court of Appeals has indicated that same-sex
second parent adoptions are not prohibited under the adoption statutes.24
Washington's UPA authorizes actions to establish parentage,25 but it
does not provide a de facto same-sex parent with standing. 6 The UPA is
intended to govern all parentage actions in Washington 27 and gives
courts the power to adjudicate parentage,28 including parenting
responsibilities. 29 The statute specifically allows for an adjudication of
maternity, 30 and it indicates that the provisions allowing for an
legal parent is unlikely to consent to a second parent adoption.
20. See In re Adoption of Parsons, 76 Wash. 2d 437, 442, 457 P.2d 544, 546 (1969).
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.260; see D.R.M., 109 Wash. App. at 189, 34 P.3d at 891.
22. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.33.010-.910.
23. See, e.g., In re Adoption of B.T., 150 Wash. 2d 409, 417-19, 78 P.3d 634, 638-39 (2003)
(holding that the standing doctrine is very broad and allowing grandparents to adopt after
intervening in a dependency hearing, as long as requirements of WASH. REV. CODE § 26.23.140 are
met).
24. See D.R.M., 109 Wash. App. at 191,34 P.3d at 892.
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.021 ("This chapter governs every determination of parentage in
this state.").
26. See id. §§ 26.26.021-.913. The UPA recognizes seven categories of persons with standing:
(1) the child; (2) the mother; (3) a man whose patemity is to be adjudicated; (4) the division of child
support; (5) an authorized adoption agency; (6) a representative authorized by law to act for a
deceased, incapacitated, or minor individual; or (7) an intended parent under a surrogate parentage
contract. See id. § 26.26.505.
27. Id. § 26.26.021(1). This statute acknowledges that the UPA does not interfere with rights and
duties under other Washington laws. Id. § 26.26.021(3). Presumably, this refers to the dependency,
adoption, and marital dissolution statutes, which all provide for determinations of the scope of
parental rights. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.34.010-.810 (2002) (dependency statute); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 26.09.002-.914 (marital dissolution statute); id. §§ 26.33.010-910 (adoption statutes).
While the UPA savings clause preserves the scope of parental authority under these statutes, it does
not indicate that parentage may be determined by other means. Id. § 26.26.021(3). The standing
provisions of the UPA, therefore, take into account other statutory methods of being declared
parents. For example, the standing provisions of the UPA clearly denote that adoptive parents may
be considered parents under the UPA. Id. § 26.26.101(1)(c), (2)(d). Therefore, this savings clause
should not be read to preserve subsequently created common law action that creates legal parents
rather than merely defining the scope of those rights.
28. See id. § 26.26.031.
29. Id. § 26.26.130(7) (providing for allocation of parenting responsibilities pursuant to WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.09, the dissolution of marriage statute).




adjudication of paternity may also be used to determine a mother-child
relationship.31
The UPA initially contained language that might have supported
same-sex parentage actions. 3' A former version of the statute allowed a
man to establish parentage if, for example, he held the child out as his
own or acknowledged paternity in writing.33 Division I noted in dicta
that these provisions might apply to a same-sex couple through the
provision that allows paternity actions to be used to determine
maternity.34 However, in 2002, the legislature repealed this section of the
UPA.35
A nonbiological partner in a same-sex relationship cannot use the
current UPA to adjudicate parenthood.36 There is no provision in the
UPA that provides for a determination of parentage on the basis of a
person's significant relationship with a child.37 In the case of artificial
insemination, the UPA affords the spouse of the woman who conceived
a presumption of fatherhood.38 Because same-sex couples cannot marry
in Washington and the UPA specifies that only a husband enjoys such a
presumption, a lesbian de facto parent cannot rely on this provision.
39
Nor do the provisions concerning surrogate contracts 40 allow a lesbian
de facto parent to be deemed an intended parent served by a "surrogate
father" because the statute is gender specific.41
31. Id. § 26.26.051 ("[T]he provisions relating to determination of paternity may be applied to a
determination of maternity.").
32. See In re Parentage of L.B., 121 Wash. App. 460, 470-71, 89 P.3d 271, 276 (2004) (citing
State ex rel. D.R.M. v. Wood, 109 Wash. App. 182, 189-91, 34 P.3d 887, 891-93 (2001)).
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.040(d)-(e) (2000), repealed by Uniform Parentage Act, ch. 302,
§ 711, 2002 Wash. Laws 1470.
34. See L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 470-71, 89 P.3d at 276; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.051
(2002) (allowing paternity actions to be used to determine maternity).
35. Uniform Parentage Act, ch. 302, § 711, 2002 Wash. Laws 1470.
36. L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 474-75, 89 P.3d at 278 (concluding that the current UPA does not
provide a cause of action for a same-sex unmarried individual to pursue parentage).
37. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.021-.913.
38. Id. § 26.26.710.
39. See, e.g., L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 474, 89 P.3d at 278 (concluding that the current UPA does
not provide a cause of action for a same-sex unmarried individual to pursue parentage).
40. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.210-.260.
41. See L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 474, 89 P.3d at 278 (noting that the UPA's surrogacy provisions
are gender specific).
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II. PRIOR TO INRE PARENTAGE OFL.B., LEGAL PARENTS
HAD RIGHTS SUPERIOR TO DE FACTO PARENTS
A de facto parent does not have the same rights42 that a legal parent
has under the United States Constitution.4 3 Under Washington law, de
facto parents have limited rights,4 but these statutory nonparental rights
are circumscribed by the legal parents' constitutional rights.45
A. Legal Parents Have a Constitutional Right to Protect Their
Relationships with Their Children, but that Right Is Not Absolute
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that parents have a
fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their
children.46 Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a
legal parent has a constitutional right to direct his or her child's
upbringing.47 These rights rest on a rebuttable presumption that a parent
acts in the best interests of his or her child;48 thus, for instance, a parent
may restrict the child's contact with certain people because it is assumed
42. See In re Custody of S.H.B., 118 Wash. App. 71, 80, 74 P.3d 674, 680 (2003).
43. In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 13-15, 969 P.2d 21, 27-28 (1998), ajfdon other
grounds sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (plurality opinion). However,
these constitutionally protected rights are not absolute. See id. at 16-17, 969 P.2d at 28-29.
44. See id. at 20, 969 P.2d at 30.
45. See In re Custody ofNunn, 103 Wash. App. 871, 884, 14 P.2d 175, 182 (2001) ("Between a
parent and a nonparent, therefore, a more stringent balancing test is required to justify awarding
custody to the nonparent.").
46. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (plurality opinion) (noting "extensive precedent.., that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children"); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923), for the
proposition that it is a fundamental Due Process right to direct the education of one's children);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (describing the "fundamental liberty interest" of
natural parents); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (noting parents have a right to raise their
children); Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("[T]he relationship between the parent and
child is constitutionally protected... by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.");
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972) (noting it is well-established that parents have a
fundamental liberty interest in their children); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (noting
the integrity of the family unit is protected under the Due Process Clause); Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (indicating that a parent's right to control the education of a
child derives from the Fourteenth Amendment).
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law."); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400 (recognizing that "liberty" in
the Fourteenth Amendment includes "establish[ing] a home and bring[ing] up children"),
48. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
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the parent acts in the child's best interest. 49 A court must defer to the
decisions of a legal parent and may not override these decisions absent a
compelling state interest. 50 Only a legal parent has these constitutionally
protected rights; nonparents, even de facto parents, do not have
constitutionally protected interests in their relationships with their
children."
Though a parent has constitutional rights, these rights are not
absolute.52 The state's parens patriae53 authority allows the state to
intervene in family decisions to protect the welfare of its citizens.54
When a fundamental liberty interest of a parent is involved, a state may
intervene only where it has a compelling interest.5 5 The U.S. Supreme
Court has upheld a state's authority to impinge on a legal parent's
autonomy, or even completely sever a parent's rights, where a child has
been harmed or where there is a threat of harm to a child.
56
Under Washington's nonparental custody statute, the state's power to
override a legal parent's wishes can be used to protect a de facto parent's
49. Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 21, 969 P.2d at 31.
50. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69 (plurality opinion). What constitutes a compelling state interest
is not settled. The Washington State Supreme Court has held that only prevention of harm to the
child constitutes such a compelling state interest. Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 18, 969 P.2d at 29. On
appeal, the Troxel Court declined to reach this question. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 (plurality
opinion).
51. Miller v. California, 355 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that de facto parents have a
right to appear in dependency proceedings, but have no other right or weightier constitutional
interest); In re Custody of S.H.B., 118 Wash. App. 71, 80, 74 P.3d 674, 680 (2003) (holding that
absent legislative action, nonparents, even those acting as in loco parentis, lack constitutional rights
of parents).
52. Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 16-17, 969 P.2d at 28-29.
53. Literally, parens patriae means "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137
(7th ed. 1999); see also Eric B. Martin, Comment, Grandma Got Run Over by the Supreme Court:
Suggestions for a Constitutional Nonparental Visitation Statute After Troxel v. Granville, 76 WASH.
L. REv. 571, 576 (2001) (discussing the parens patriae doctrine).
54. Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 15-16, 969 P.2d at 28.
55. Id. (citing, inter alia, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)). The Washington State
Supreme Court has gone further and held that the remedy must serve a state's compelling interest.
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not reached the question of whether the remedy must be
narrowly tailored when it conflicts with a legal parent's constitutional rights. See Sally F. Goldfarb,
Visitation for Nonparents After Troxel v. Granville: Where Should States Draw the Line?, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 783, 785-86 (2001) (arguing that the Court failed to agree on the proper standard of
review).
56. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-32 (1972). In its most recent case addressing the
subject, however, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to consider whether a showing of harm was
necessary where a case involved visitation by nonparents. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73
(2000) (plurality opinion).
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relationship with a child.57 In order to receive custody under this statute,
a petitioner must either show that the legal parent does not have physical
custody or allege that neither legal parent is a suitable custodian. 58 A
legal parent is not a suitable custodian when he or she causes actual
detriment to the child.5 9 To show actual detriment, a petitioner must do
more than convince the court that it is not in the child's best interests to
remain with the legal parent, but need not show parental unfitness.
60
The visitation provisions in Washington's nonparental custody statute
are even broader than its custodial provisions. 61 The statute allows
"[a]ny person" to petition for visitation "at any time," as long as the
visitation is in the best interests of the child.62 In 1998, the Washington
State Supreme Court held that the statute was so broad as to be facially
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution
because it infringed on fundamental rights of parents and did not serve a
compelling state interest. 63 In Troxel v. Granville,64 the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the Washington State Supreme Court's decision, but held
the statute unconstitutional only as applied because the trial court did not
57. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.10.010-.913 (2002); see also In re Custody of Stell, 56 Wash. App.
356, 365, 783 P.2d 615, 620 (1989) (concluding that a de facto parent can be awarded custody under
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10 (1988)).
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.030(1). If the child is in the custody of a parent, the statute
requires an allegation that neither legal parent is a suitable parent. Id. Division I has interpreted the
statute to require that the petitioner prevail on this element if the child is in the custody of a parent
and the petitioner wishes to gain custody. In re Custody of S.H.B., 118 Wash. App. 71, 79, 74 P.3d
674, 679 (2003).
59. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash. App. 637, 649, 626 P.2d 16, 23 (1981) ("In
extraordinary circumstances, where placing the child with an otherwise fit parent would be
detrimental to the child, the parent's right to custody is outweighed by the state's interest in the
child's welfare.").
60. Id. ("There must be a showing of actual detriment to the child, something greater than the
comparative and balancing analyses of the 'best interests of the child' test ... [b]ut unfitness of the
parent need not be shown."); see also In re Custody of Shields, 120 Wash. App. 108, 111, 84 P.3d
905, 906 (2004) (holding that the nonparental custody action requires a showing of parental
unfitness or actual detriment); In re Custody of R.R.B., 108 Wash. App. 602, 615-16, 31 P.3d 1212,
1219-20 (2001) (affirming an award of custody to the biological parent where the trial court found
placement with the otherwise fit legal adoptive parents would be detrimental to the child); Stell, 56
Wash. App. at 365, 783 P.2d at 620 (affirming an award of custody to an aunt when placement with
the father would cause actual detriment to the child).
61. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67 (plurality opinion) ("The Washington nonparental visitation statute
is breathtakingly broad.").
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3).
63. See In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 19, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (1998), ajfd on other
grounds sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
64. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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give deference to the legal parent's wishes.65 Division I has subsequently
held that the visitation provision remains valid as long as it complies
with the limitations imposed by Troxel.66 Because deference to a
parent's wishes may be overcome where a child is harmed,67 and
Washington courts recognize that severing a de facto parent-child bond
could cause harm,6  a visitation order under the provisions of the
nonparental visitation statute could comply with Troxel.
69
B. Prior to In re Parentage of L.B., Washington Courts Recognized
the Importance of De Facto Parents in Limited Circumstances
Recognizing the importance of the psychological relationship
between children and de facto parents, Washington courts have awarded
visitation or custody to de facto parents in limited circumstances. 70 The
65. See id. at 69, 73, 75 (plurality opinion) (holding that the trial court violated Granville's
parental rights by not giving special weight to her wishes). The U.S. Supreme Court did not reach
the question of whether the Due Process Clause requires a showing of harm to satisfy the
compelling state interest condition precedent to granting visitation. Id. at 73.
66. See In re Parentage of L.B., 121 Wash. App. 460, 490, 89 P.3d 271, 286 (2004) ("[T]he third-
party visitation statute is facially valid when construed in accord with the principles of
Troxel .. "). Whether this is a correct analysis of the effect of Troxel on the Washington State
Supreme Court's holding in Smith is beyond the scope of this Note. At the very least, it remains an
open question.
67. See In re Custody of R.R.B., 108 Wash. App. 602, 616, 31 P.3d 1212, 1219-20 (2001); see
also Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 15-16, 969 P.2d at 28 ("[T]he state may step in and override a decision
of a parent where the decision would harm the child.").
68. See, e.g., Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 20, 969 P.2d at 30 (noting that where a significant
relationship with a child is severed, there is potential for harm to the child).
69. See, e.g., L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 490, 89 P.3d at 286 (holding that the third party visitation
statute could be constitutionally applied in the case of a de facto lesbian parent); see also In re
Parentage of C.A.M.A., 120 Wash. App. 199, 214, 84 P.3d 1253, 1260 (2004) ("Finally, Troxel also
required special factors which might justify the state's interference with a parent's fundamental
right to make decisions. We conclude that one such factor is a longstanding de facto parental
relationship between the petitioner and the child.").
70. See, e.g., In re Dependency of.J.H., 117 Wash. 2d 460, 469, 815 P.2d 1380, 1384 (1991) ("In
certain limited circumstances our appellate courts have recognized the importance of psychological
parents to the welfare of children."); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash. 2d 299, 313, 738 P.2d 254,
263 (1987) (remanding a dispute between a putative and natural father with the direction that both
be given the opportunity to petition for reasonable visitation rights); In re Custody of Shields, 120
Wash. App. 108, 130-31, 84 P.3d 905, 916 (2004) (affirming custody award to stepmother after the
death of the child's father because the child had been well-integrated into the family of the
stepparent); In re Dependency of Ramquist, 52 Wash. App. 854, 862, 765 P.2d 30, 35 (1988)
(affirming an award of custody to foster parents after the parent's rights were terminated because
the child was psychologically bonded to the foster family); In re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash. App.
637, 649, 626 P.2d 16, 23 (1981) (awarding custody to the stepmother upon determination that
placement with the father would cause actual detriment to the child).
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courts have recognized that harm to the child may occur when a
significant relationship between the child and an adult is severed.7' In In
re Custody of Smith,72 the Washington State Supreme Court noted that
"[i]n certain circumstances where a child has enjoyed a substantial
relationship with a third person, arbitrarily depriving the child of the
relationship could cause severe psychological harm to the child.,
73
Washington courts have recognized the importance of the stability of
these relationships even when the adult involved is not a legal or natural
parent.74
Prior to L.B., the rights of those de facto parents who could
demonstrate such a significant relationship were typically limited to
situations in which the rights of the legal parents did not conflict with
those of the de facto parent.75 For example, the Washington State
Supreme Court held that an aunt and uncle who had commenced a
nonparental custody action and been awarded temporary custody had a
right to intervene in a concurrent dependency action to terminate the
legal parents' rights.76 Thus, in a dependency action in which the legal
parent's rights are severed, a de facto parent could intervene and obtain
custody.77 Courts have awarded custody or visitation to nonparents with
psychological bonds in the context of stepparent divorces and contested
paternity actions. 8
71. See, e.g., Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 20, 969 P.2d at 30 (recognizing potential for harm where a
substantial relationship is severed); J.H., 117 Wash. 2d at 469, 815 P.2d at 1384 (acknowledging the
importance of relationships between children and nonparent caretakers); McDaniels, 108 Wash. 2d
at 310-11, 738 P.2d at 261-62 (recognizing a bond between child and two putative fathers); Allen,
28 Wash. App. at 649, 626 P.2d at 23 (recognizing the bond between a child and stepmother).
72. 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21 (1998), affd on other grounds sub nom. Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
73. Id. at 20, 969 P.2d at 30.
74. "Child development experts widely stress the importance of stability and predictability in
parent/child relationships, even where the parent figure is not the natural parent." McDaniels, 108
Wash. 2d at 310, 738 P.2d at 261 (citing generally, inter alia, J. GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979)); see Allen, 28 Wash. App. at 648, 626 P.2d at 23 ("Where
the reason for deferring to parental rights-the goal of preserving families-would be ill-served by
maintaining parental custody, as where a child is integrated into the nonparent's family, the de facto
family relationship does not exist as to the natural parent and need not be supported.").
75. See, e.g., J.H., 117 Wash. 2d at 471, 815 P.2d at 1385 (reasoning that foster parents have a
permissive right to intervene so long as their intervention does not conflict with the legal parent's
rights).
76. In re Dependency of J.W.H., 147 Wash. 2d 687, 700, 57 P.3d 266, 272 (2002).
77. See, e.g., In re Dependency of Ramquist, 52 Wash. App. 854, 863, 765 P.2d 30, 35 (1988)
(upholding termination of a natural parent's relationship in favor of foster parents).




C. Prior to In Re Parentage of L.B., a De Facto Parent's Remedies
Were Limited
Although a court could award to a de facto parent either visitation or
custody over the wishes of a legal parent, a de facto parent has fewer
remedies and rights.79 In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,8 ° the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed foster parents' contention that the U.S.
Constitution protected their psychological parent relationships with the
children in their care.81 The Court assumed, without deciding, that a
right to protect a substantial relationship with a child did exist and held
that New York's procedural protections for foster parents were
sufficient.82 The Court cautioned that constitutional rights for nonparents
such as foster parents would necessarily be in tension with a legal
parent's constitutional rights.83 Therefore, the Court concluded that
where a foster parent's wishes conflict with a legal parent's wishes, the
rights of the foster parent "must be substantially attenuated where the
proposed removal from the foster family is to return the child to his
,,84natural parents.
Though the U.S. Supreme Court has not explained when rights are
substantially attenuated,85 Washington courts make this determination by
carefully balancing the rights of the child's nonparents, legal parents,
and the state.86 In In re Custody of Nunn,8 7 Division I of the Court of
both a natural father and a putative father were entitled to petition for visitation regardless of the
outcome of a paternity action); Allen, 28 Wash. App. at 644, 626 P.2d at 21 (interpreting the divorce
statute to allow an award of custody to a stepparent); see also In re Parentage of L.B., 121 Wash.
App. 460, 478-81, 89 P.3d 271, 280-81 (2004) (citing cases in which courts awarded visitation or
custody to nonparents).
79. In re Custody of S.H.B., 118 Wash. App. 71, 80, 74 P.3d 674, 680 (2003) (holding that absent
legislative action, nonparents, even those acting as in loco parentis, lack constitutional rights of a
parent); Miller v. California, 355 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that de facto parents have
a right to appear in dependency proceedings, but have no other right or weightier interest of
constitutional dimension).
80. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
81. See id. at 846-47.
82. Id. at 847.
83. See id. at 846; accord Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("The
extension of statutory rights in this area to persons other than a child's parents, however, comes
with an obvious cost. For example, [it] can place a substantial burden on the traditional parent-child
relationship.").
84. See Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. at 847.
85. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring) ("Our cases, it is true, have not set out
exact metes and bounds to the protected interest of a parent in the relationship with his child ....").
86. See, e.g., In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 19 n.4, 969 P.2d 21, 30 n.4 (1998)
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Appeals reversed the trial court's award of custody to a paternal aunt
over a fit biological mother after the death of the biological father.88 The
court reasoned that a stringent balancing test is required in a custody
dispute between a legal parent and a nonparent to justify awarding
custody to a nonparent.89 Thus, the court held that in order to minimize
state interference with a family unit, a nonparent must produce evidence
of parental unfitness before a court can award custody to the
nonparent. 90 Unless the nonparent can show the child is being or will be
harmed, a nonparent has no standing to challenge a legal parent's
rights. 91
Even where a de facto parent's asserted rights did not conflict with a
legal parent's, 92  Washington courts have acknowledged that the
nonparent had limited due process protection in comparison to the legal
parent.93 At common law, nonparents, even grandparents, had no legal
right to petition for visitation or custody.94 Similarly, a nonparent is not
entitled to the same presumptions as a legal parent within the
(acknowledging that the court had applied a balancing analysis and affirming the result because the
threshold showing of harm was met), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (plurality
opinion); id. at 24, 969 P.2d at 32 (Talmadge, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that
the court must balance the interests of the child, legal parent, and state before awarding visitation);
In re Custody of Nunn, 103 Wash. App. 871, 884, 14 P.3d 175, 182 (2001) (reasoning that a more
stringent balancing test is required when determining whether to award custody or visitation to a
parent or a nonparent); In re Custody of Anderson, 77 Wash. App. 261, 264, 890 P.2d 525, 526
(1995) (holding that in a custody dispute between parents and nonparents, the analysis must
accommodate the natural parent's constitutional interests.); In re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash. App.
637, 646, 626 P.2d 16, 22 (1981) (applying a balancing test among parental rights, state interests,
and child's interests to determine when a nonparent may be awarded custody).
87. 103 Wash. App. 871, 14 P.3d 175 (2001).
88. Id. at 873-74, 14 P.3d at 177.
89. See id. at 884, 14 P.3d at 182. The strongest expression of this approach comes from Smith, in
which the Washington State Supreme Court held that a petitioner must make a showing of harm to
the child before the court can intervene to order visitation. Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 20, 969 P.2d at
30.
90. See Nunn, 103 Wash. App. at 883, 14 P.3d at 181.
91. See id.
92. In Washington, a foster parent may not be involved, for example, where the state has
instituted a dependency hearing to terminate a legal parent's rights. In re Dependency of J.H., 117
Wash. 2d 460, 471-72, 815 P.2d 1380, 1385 (1991) (reasoning that foster parents have a permissive
right to intervene as long as their intervention does not conflict with the legal parent's rights).
93. See, e.g., In re Custody of S.H.B., 118 Wash. App. 71, 80, 74 P.3d 674, 680 (2003) (holding
that, absent legislative action, nonparents-even those acting as parents-lack constitutional
protections).
94. See Martin, supra note 53, at 579.
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nonparental custody statute.95 In practice, this means that a court can
override the nonparent's wishes without providing the same due process
protections granted to a parent.96 As a corollary, once a nonparent ceases
to act as the child's parent, the nonparent's legal obligation to support
the child ends.97
Thus, before In re Parentage of L.B., there was a significant
difference between the rights of de facto and legal parents.98 As a
nonparent petitioning under the nonparent custody and visitation statute,
a de facto parent could ask a court to intervene only when there is actual
detriment to the child. 99 Even then, the due process rights of the
nonparent with a court order were limited in comparison to those of a
legal parent.' 00
III. STATUTES AND JUDICIAL CAUTION LIMIT THE
AUTHORITY OF WASHINGTON COURTS TO CREATE
COMMON LAW
Washington courts have the authority to create common law, but this
authority is limited.101 A court may not, for example, contravene statutes
or statutory intent. °2 Moreover, the Washington State Supreme Court
has indicated that a court should be cautious in creating common law
"absent prior legislative or judicial expression on the subject." 10 3 In In re
95. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.10.010-913 (2002); S.H.B., 118 Wash. App. at 80-82, 74 P.3d
at 680-81 ("Nonparents-including adoptive parents, legal guardians, grandparents, and persons
acting in an in loco parentis capacity--do not have the same constitutional rights of a parent, absent
legislative action.").
96. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 853 (1977) (noting that the "balance
of due process interests must accordingly be different" between a foster parent and a natural parent).
97. See, e.g., State ex rel. D.R.M. v. Wood, 109 Wash. App. 182, 193, 34 P.3d 887, 893-94
(2001) (noting that when a stepparent's custodial relationship ends, so does the support duty).
98. See. e.g., S.H.B., 118 Wash. App. at 80, 74 P.3d at 680 (noting that nonparents do not have
the same constitutional rights as parents).
99. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
100. S.H.B., 118 Wash. App. at 80, 74 P.3d at 680.
101. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d 712, 724-25, 976 P.2d 1229, 1235 (1999) (refusing
to read omission liability into an accomplice statute absent legislative intent).
102. See, e.g., id. (noting that the court may not rewrite unambiguous statutes to suit the court's
notion of public policy).
103. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 232, 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (1984)
(citation omitted) (indicating that courts should be cautious in expanding the common law tort for
wrongful discharge unless there is a prior judicially or legislatively recognized public policy
favoring such expansion).
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Parentage of L.B., Division I cited recent decisions to articulate that a
court may create common law where there is a void in the statutes and a
clear public policy mandate.104
In Washington, courts have the authority and duty to alter the
common law as justice requires. 10 5 The common law consists of court-
made rules, 10 6 fashioned to adjust the law to deal with the "rich variety"
of cases confronting the courts. 10 7 The court's authority over the
common law may extend to creating new judicial remedies.'0 8 In Ueland
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 109 for example, the Washington State Supreme
Court, recognizing a child's independent cause of action for loss of
parental consortium, noted that to defer to the legislature would
"abdicate [the court's] responsibility to reform the common law to meet
the evolving standards of justice."' 10
A court's authority over the common law is limited by statute.' The
common law gives way to statutory authority when statute and common
law conflict." 2 Courts are guided by statutory intent when they
determine whether a statute abrogates the common law." 3 The goal of
statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent and purpose of the
legislature." 4 The court may not substitute its own interpretation of
public policy in place of the legislature's." 5 This prohibition includes
104. In re Parentage of L.B., 121 Wash. App. 460, 476 n.2, 89 P.3d 271, 279 n.2 (2004).
105. Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 95, 614 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980) ("Indeed, we
have often discharged our duty to reassess the common law and alter it where justice requires.").
106. Spokane Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 81 Wash. 2d 283, 286, 501 P.2d
589, 591 (1972).
107. Lundgren, 94 Wash. 2d at 95, 614 P.2d at 1275 (quoting Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 525 P.2d 669, 676 (Cal. 1974)).
108. Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 136, 691 P.2d 190, 193 (1984) ("When
justice requires, this court does not hesitate to expand the common law and recognize a cause of
action.").
109. 103 Wash. 2d 131,691 P.2d 190(1984).
110. Id. at 136, 691 P.2d at 193.
111. State ex rel. Madden v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 83 Wash. 2d 219, 221, 517 P.2d 585, 587
(1973).
112. Id. at 222, 517 P.2dat 587.
113. In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 969 P.2d 21, 24-25 (1998) ("The purpose of
statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to legislative intent. Legislative intent is
primarily determined from statutory language." (citations omitted)), ajd on other grounds sub
nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
114. Harmon v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 134 Wash. 2d 523, 530, 951 P.2d 770, 773
(1998).
115. See State v. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d 712, 725, 976 P.2d 1229, 1235 (1999) (refusing to read
failure to meet common law duty of support to a child as a crime under accomplice liability statute).
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"resist[ing] the temptation to rewrite an unambiguous statute to suit [the
court's] notions of what is good public policy...., 116
The court also may not adopt a common law cause of action that
conflicts with an existing statutory scheme. 17 Nor may the court create a
cause of action where the legislature intends the statutory remedy to be
exclusive.'1 18 Thus, although the court may create common law in an area
of law in which the legislature has acted,119 the court's authority is
strongest where the cause of action originated in the common law120 or
"in a field peculiarly nonstatutory .... ,,121 In a field of law in which the
legislature has acted, the court may act only where there is a void in the
statutes. 122
In Philippides v. Bernard,2 3 the Washington State Supreme Court
held that a court may not act on matters where the legislature has created
a comprehensive set of statutes. 124 The court refused to acknowledge a
common law cause of action for loss of consortium on behalf of the
parents of an adult dependent. 125 A majority of eight justices held that
because the legislature had created a comprehensive set of statues
governing who can recover in wrongful death actions, the court was
precluded from acting.1 26 Writing for the majority, Justice Faith Ireland
observed that creating a common law remedy would directly conflict
116. Id.
117. Philippides v. Bernard, 151 Wash. 2d 376, 390, 88 P.3d 939, 946 (2004).
118. Roberts v. Dudley, 92 Wash. App. 652, 655, 966 P.2d 377, 378-79 (1998) (stating that the
first step in determining whether to create a common law cause of action is to determine if the
legislature intended to preempt the common law), aft'd, 140 Wash. 2d 58, 993 P.2d 901 (2000).
119. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wash. App. 92, 100, 600 P.2d 602, 607 (1979) ("The legislature may
legislate in areas dealing with facets of tort law involving familial relationships, but such legislative
action does not divest courts of their authority to alter rules of law which had their genesis in the
courts under the common law.").
120. Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wash. 2d 614, 617, 565 P.2d 94, 96 (1977) ("Because the action has its
origins in the common law and has not been acted upon by the legislature, it is proper for us to
reexamine it and determine its continued viability in light of present-day society.").
121. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 657, 251 P.2d 149, 157 (1952) (quoting Woods v. Lancet,
102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (N.Y. 1951)).
122. Roberts, 92 Wash. App. at 655, 966 P.2d at 378-79 (determining that a court may use
common law to fill such a void); see also In re Parentage of L.B., 121 Wash. App. 460, 476 n.2, 89
P.3d 271, 279 n.2 (2004) (indicating that a common law remedy survives the enactment of a
statutory remedy if the common law fills a void).
123. 151 Wash. 2d 376, 88 P.3d 939 (2004).
124. Id. at 390, 88 P.3d at 946 (holding that the court may not create a common law beneficiary
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with existing statutes.1
27
In addition to heeding the limitations imposed by statutes, a court
should proceed cautiously when creating a common law cause of
action. 28 In developing a new common law cause of action for the tort
of wrongful discharge, 29 the Washington State Supreme Court warned
that the court "should not create public policy but instead recognize only
clearly existing public policy . .. ,,130 The court indicated that the
legislature is the fundamental source of public policy and that courts
should not act upon previously unrecognized public policy.13' However,
the Washington State Supreme Court also indicated that in other
circumstances132  it would extend common law if there was a
"compelling necessity. ', 133 Thus, Washington courts should proceed
cautiously when creating a new common law cause of action.1
34
IV. IN IN RE PARENTAGE OF L.B., DIVISION I CREATED A
COMMON LAW PARENTAGE ACTION
In In re Parentage of L.B., Division I of the Washington State Court
of Appeals addressed Sue Ellen Carvin's petition to be declared a parent
of L.B. under Washington's UPA. 135 Prior to L.B., there was a
127. Id.
128. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 232, 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (1984)
(quoting Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) ("[C]ourts should
proceed cautiously if called upon to declare public policy absent some prior legislative or judicial
expression on the subject." (emphasis in original))).
129. The court created this cause of action to ameliorate the common law rule of employment
terminable at will in Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 232-33, 685 P.2d at 1089. The new cause of action
allows a common law suit for wrongful discharge where there is a clear public policy against
allowing the discharge. Id. The court adopted this exception to the common rule despite state
legislative action against wrongful discharge. Id. at 226, 685 P.2d at 1086.
130. Sedlacek v. Hillis, 145 Wash. 2d 379, 390, 36 P.3d 1014, 1020 (2001).
131. Id. at 390, 36 P.3d at 1019.
132. Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 53 Wash. 2d 103, 106-107, 330 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1958) (declining
to allow a child to maintain an independent cause of action for loss of consortium where the father
conceded he had a statutory remedy). Although Erhardt was never overruled, the Washington State
Supreme Court later adopted this cause of action in Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d
131, 136, 691 P.2d 190, 193 (1984).
133. Erhardt, 53 Wash. 2d at 106, 330 P.2d at 1012; see also In re Parentage of L.B., 121 Wash.
App. 460, 476 n.2, 89 P.3d 271, 279 n.2 (2004) (adopting the language from Thompson and
Sedlacek to require a clear mandate of public policy before acting); Roth v. Bell, 24 Wash. App. 92,
100, 600 P.2d 602, 607 (1979) (interpreting Erhardt to require a compelling necessity before
adopting a new cause of action).
134. See Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 232, 685 P.2d at 1089.
135. See L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 465, 89 P.3d at 274.
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significant difference between the rights of de facto and legal parents.
136
The court in L.B. held that Washington recognizes a common law
parentage action and adopted a test previously articulated by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. 13 7 The court's decision, allowing de facto
parents to be declared legal parents, gives de facto parents the
constitutional protections that they did not previously have. 138 The court
also held in the alternative that a lesbian nonbiological parent had a
cause of action under the visitation provisions of the nonparental custody
statute. 
39
Sue Ellen Carvin and Page Britain, a lesbian couple, became
romantically involved in 1989 and began cohabiting.1 40 After five years,
they decided Britain would have a child via artificial insemination, and
they procured sperm from John Auseth, a gay male friend.14' Carvin and
Britain acted as the child's primary caretakers for the first six years of
the child's life. 142 Although the couple discussed adoption, Carvin did
not adopt L.B.
143
In 2001, when L.B. was six, Britain decided to separate from
Carvin. 14 4 Initially, the couple shared parenting of L.B., but shortly after
the split Britain and Auseth terminated Carvin's visitation with L.B.
145
Carvin then filed a petition to be declared L.B.'s legal parent. 46 The trial
court found that L.B. had been harmed by the separation from Carvin,
but held that Carvin had no cause of action under the UPA. 147 The trial
136. See, e.g., In re Custody of S.H.B., 118 Wash. App. 71, 80, 74 P.3d 674, 680 (2003) (noting
nonparents do not have the same constitutional rights as parents).
137. L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 485, 487, 89 P.3d at 285.
138. Id. at 485, 487, 89 P.3d at 285 (holding that the common law cause of action would allow a
court to award a de facto parent shared parentage). In other words, their rights are the same after
they are declared de facto parents. Id.
139. Id. at 488, 89 P.3d at 285.
140. Id. at 465, 89 P.3d at 274.
141. Id. at 465-66, 89 P.3d at 274.
142. Id. at 467, 89 P.3d at 275.
143. Id. at 467, 89 P.3d at 274.
144. Id. at 467, 89 P.3d at 275.
145. Id. at 467-68, 89 P.3d at 275.
146. Id. at 468, 89 P.3d at 275. Shortly after Carvin filed her petition, Britain married Auseth, and
he signed a declaration of paternity. Id. Britain argued at the appellate court that Auseth should be
allowed to intervene in the proceeding. Id. at 490, 89 P.3d at 286. The court declined to reach the
question of Auseth's place in the proceeding, but remanded for the trial court to make an initial
determination. Id. Therefore, this Note will not address Auseth's standing.
147. Id. at 469, 89 P.3d at 276.
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court also declined to create a common law parentage action and
determined that the nonparental visitation statute did not apply because
Carvin had not shown that Britain was an unfit parent. 
148
On appeal, Division I reversed the trial court's decision and
recognized a common law cause of action that allows de facto parents to
adjudicate parentage. 149 The court held that Carvin did not have a cause
of action under Washington's UPA. 150 Specifically, it held that although
L.B. was conceived via artificial insemination, the artificial insemination
provisions in the UPA applied only to married couples. 51 Nor could
Carvin rely on the surrogate parent standing provisions because the
statute's definition of "surrogate parent" was gender specific. 152 The
court determined that the UPA was unambiguous and, because the UPA
did not cover Carvin's situation, she had no cause of action.
1 53
Nonetheless, the court reasoned that "our Legislature cannot have
intended to leave parties to such parentage arrangements and the
children born of such arrangements without any remedy whatsoever."
1 54
The court then held that courts may create a common law remedy when
the remedy "fills a void in the law for redress of an act or omission that
contravenes a clear mandate of public policy.' 55 Under this test, the
court reasoned that Washington's prior judicial recognition of de facto
parentage provided the public policy mandate necessary to justify
creating a common law cause of action.
156
To determine the parameters of the common law doctrine, the court
turned to other jurisdictions that have recognized a common law cause
148. Id.
149. Id. at 487, 89 P.3d at 285.
150. Id. at 474-75, 89 P.3d at 278. The 2002 amendment to the UPA repealed WASH REV. CODE
§ 26.26.040 (2000), which Division I of the Court of Appeals indicated might cover a same-sex
partner of a biological parent who signed a declaration of paternity. Id. (construing State ex rel.
D.R.M. v. Wood, 109 Wash. App. 182, 189-91, 34 P.3d 887, 891-93 (2001)).
151. Id. at 474, 89 P.3dat 278.
152. Id. at 473-74, 89 P.3d at 278; see also WASH, REV. CODE § 26.26.210(3)-.210(4) (2002)
(specifying that a surrogate is a female who gestates a child and that a surrogate contract means a
contract in which a female gestates a child and relinquishes parental rights).
153. L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 474-75, 89 P.3d at 278.
154. Id. at 475-76, 89 P.3d at 279.
155. Id. at 476 n.2, 89 P.3d at 279 n.2.
156. Id. The court also cited Washington's Equal Rights Amendment as a source of public policy.
Id. The court, however, did not address that issue in depth, id. at 476, 89 P.3d at 278-79, and it is




of action for de facto parents such as Carvin. 157 Specifically, the court
followed the test delineated by the Wisconsin State Supreme Court in In
re Custody of H.S.H.-K."' Division I held that Carvin must show on
remand that (1) Britain consented to and fostered the parent-like
relationship; (2) Carvin and L.B. lived together in the same household;
(3) Carvin assumed the obligations of parenthood without expectation of
financial compensation; and (4) Carvin had been in the parental role
long enough to establish a dependent, bonded parental relationship.' 59
Division I's formulation, however, exceeded that of the Wisconsin
court by extending the doctrine to full parentage rather than merely
visitation.160 The Wisconsin court articulated a doctrine that allows a
same-sex de facto parent standing to bring a visitation petition, 161 but
dismissed the custody action on the grounds that proving the existence
of a parent-like relationship was insufficient to justify custody.
162
Similarly, other jurisdictions that have adopted equitable parent
doctrines have stopped short of allowing a de facto parent to be adjudged
a legal parent.
163
In the alternative, the L.B. court held that a de facto parent had
standing to petition the court for visitation under the Washington
nonparental custody statute. 164 The court adopted the actual detriment
test for supporting an award of visitation. 65 The court further implied
that a de facto parent would likely meet this actual detriment standard by
showing that the legal parent's decision to stop visitation might harm the
child. 166 On this independent ground, the court indicated that Carvin may
157. Id. at 481-85, 89 P.3d at 282-83.
158. 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995); L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 487, 89 P.3d at 285.
159. L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 487, 89 P.3d at 285.
160. See id.
161. H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 436 (discussing Wisconsin's statutory basis for denying legal
parents custody). The court also noted that the custody statutes in Wisconsin were intended to be the
exclusive means of determining parentage. See id. at 431.
162. Id. at 420 ("We affirm that part of the order dismissing the petition for custody ....
163. See T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 920 (Pa. 2001) (affirming an award of partial custody and
visitation); cf V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 554 (N.J. 2001) ("Once a third party has been
determined to be a psychological parent... he or she stands in parity with the legal parent.").
Despite this quote, the court did not award custody rights to the third party, only visitation rights. Id.
(holding that visitation is the presumptive rule); see also Jacobs, supra note 1, at 366-69 (discussing
the ways in which equitable doctrines in Wisconsin, New Jersey, and Massachusetts do not give full
parental protections).
164. L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 488-90, 89 P.3d at 285-86.
165. Id. at 489, 89 P.3d at 286.
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be entitled to visitation rights.
167
V. DIVISION I EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN CREATING A
COMMON LAW DE FACTO PARENTAGE ACTION
Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals exceeded its
authority when it created a common law parentage action for de facto
parents. The Washington State Legislature intended Washington's UPA
to be the exclusive means of establishing paternity.1 68 Moreover, when
the UPA is read in combination with the nonparental custody statute, the
statutory scheme effectively preempts common law parentage actions. 69
Even if the UPA and nonparental visitation statute were not exclusive,
Division I's own test for when courts can create a common law cause of
action requires a clear mandate of public policy. 7 ° The nonparental
custody statute, which allows a de facto parent to petition for visitation,
adequately prevents harm to the child while protecting the legal parent's
constitutional rights. 171 Given the complex constitutional issues
involved, the court should not have created a common law parentage
action.
A. Division I Exceeded Its Authority in Creating a Common Law
Cause ofAction Because the UPA Is Intended to Be the Exclusive
Means of Determining Parentage
Because the UPA was intended to be the exclusive means of
determining parentage, 172 a court may not create a common law
parentage action. Washington courts do not hesitate to create common
166. See id. at 489, 89 P.3d at 285-86 ("Under Washington case law ... Carvin does not need to
prove that Britain is unfit in the classical sense, but only that it is detrimental to the child to sever
the very parent-child relationship that Britain first consented to and fostered.").
167. Id.
168. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.021 (2002).
169. See, e.g., Philippides v. Bernard, 151 Wash. 2d 376, 390, 88 P.3d 939, 946 (2004)
(explaining that a comprehensive statutory scheme leaves no room for a court to create common
law).
170. See L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 476 n.2, 89 P.3d at 279 n.2.
171. Id. at 490, 89 P.3d at 286 (concluding that when properly applied, the nonparental custody
statute recognizes the presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interests of the child and its
remedy is narrowly tailored); see also In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 436 (Wis.
1995) (explaining that de facto parent visitation protects parental constitutional rights and the
child's best interest).




law where it is in the interest of justice.173 The common law authority of
the courts is, however, limited both by statute 174 and by the judicial
canon of caution. 17 Division I recognized this in In re Parentage of L.B.
by noting that it could create a common law cause of action only where
there was a statutory void and a clear mandate of public policy.1 76 The
court's opinion, however, fails its own test.
The UPA does not grant standing to same-sex couples to adjudicate
parentage. 177 The current version of the statute, as Division I held,
"clearly does not" allow same-sex couples to pursue parentage under the
UPA. 178 The court further noted that the standing provisions of the UPA
were unambiguous and that a same-sex partner like Carvin did not fit
any of the unambiguous categories granted standing.' 79 Thus, the plain
language of the statute does not allow same-sex de facto parents to be
declared legal parents.
Moreover, the UPA is intended to be the exclusive method for
determining parentage. 80 The statute expressly states: "This chapter
governs every determination of parentage in this state."'' The court
acknowledged this plain language,' 82 but concluded that because the
legislature intentionally excluded same-sex couples who have children
via artificial insemination, the legislature intended for the omission to be
remedied by the courts. 83 This interpretation is inconsistent with the
statute's unambiguous language stating that the UPA governs every
parentage determination in Washington. 184 The very existence of a
common law parentage action directly contradicts the statute, and
because a court should not "rewrite an umabiguous statute to suit [the
court's] notions of what is good public policy... ,,,85 Division I
exceeded its authority in creating a common law parentage action,
173. See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
176. In re Parentage of L.B., 121 Wash. App. 460, 476 n.2, 89 P.3d 271, 279 n.2 (2004).
177. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
178. L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 474-75, 89 P.3d at 278.
179. Id. at 472, 89 P.3d at 278.
180. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.021 (2002) (defining the scope of UPA).
181. Id. § 26.26.021(1).
182. L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 476 n.2, 89 P.3d at 279 n.2.
183. Id. at 475-76, 89 P.3d at 279.
184. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.02 1.
185. State v. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d 712, 725, 976 P.2d 1229, 1235 (1999).
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regardless of its public policy rationale.
Additionally, despite Division I's conclusion that the legislature
"cannot have intended" to leave same-sex couples without remedy,' 86
the omission of same-sex couples from the UPA should be interpreted to
mean the legislature intended to exclude same-sex couples.'8 7 The
legislature amended the UPA in 2002 and repealed the clause that may
have applied to same-sex couples. 88 The decision to repeal those
provisions should be read as intentional exclusion of same-sex couples
from the UPA.
B. The Statutory Scheme Preempts Division I's Creation of a
Common Law Parentage Action
Division I's conclusion that the legislature intended the courts to fill
the void in the UPA with common law 89 is further undermined because
de facto parents have remedies under Washington's adoption' 90 and
nonparental custody statutes.'19 The court's own alternative holding that
Carvin had a statutory remedy under the nonparental custody statute 92
means that there is no statutory void to fill. A de facto parent can, for
example, pursue a second parent adoption. 93 Because an adoptive parent
is a legal parent 194 and there is no prohibition against same-sex
adoptions,' 95 the adoption statute can provide a same-sex de facto parent
with full constitutional protections. 196
186. L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 475-76, 89 P.3d at 279.
187. See Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d at 724-25, 976 P.2d at 1235 (admonishing the court to resist
rewriting an unambiguous statute to suit the court's public policy rationale); see also L.B., 121
Wash. App. at 473, 89 P.3d at 278 (noting that a lesbian nonbiological parent does not fit into any of
the unambiguous categories for standing).
188. L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 470-71, 89 P.3d at 276-78 (citing State ex rel. D.R.M. v. Wood,
109 Wash. App. 182, 189-91, 34 P.3d 887, 891-93 (2001)); see supra notes 32-35 and
accompanying text.
189. L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 476, 89 P.3d at 279.
190. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text. A de facto parent also has recourse under the
dependency statutes. See In re Dependency of Ramquist, 52 Wash. App. 854, 862, 765 P.2d 30, 35
(1988).
192. L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 488, 89 P.3d at 285.
193. See State ex rel. D.R.M. v. Wood, 109 Wash. App. 182, 191, 34 P.3d 887, 892 (2001).
194. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.260 (2002); see D.R.M., 109 Wash. App. at 189, 34 P.3d at 891.
195. See D.R.M., 109 Wash. App. at 191,34 P.3d at 892.




Even after the dissolution of a same-sex relationship, Washington's
statutory scheme provides a remedy for a same-sex de facto parent via
the nonparental statute. 197 If the de facto parent can demonstrate that the
child will suffer actual detriment, she can be awarded visitation or
custody.1 98 Because Washington courts already recognize that severing a
significant relationship, such as a de facto parent-child relationship, may
cause children harm, a de facto parent could demonstrate this actual
detriment. 199 Division I acknowledged this in In re Parentage of L.B. by
holding that a de facto parent had standing to petition for visitation under
the nonparental statute.2°°
Thus, the statutory scheme preempts a common law remedy. A court
cannot act in a field in which a comprehensive set of statutes exists.20 1 In
Philippides, the court refused to extend the common law to allow parents
to recover for loss of consortium caused by the death of an adult child.202
The court reasoned that the legislature had created a comprehensive
203
wrongful death statute that defined statutory beneficiaries. To add
parents of adult children to those beneficiaries would alter the legislative
directive and exceed judicial authority.20 4 Similarly, with the UPA the
legislature has created a comprehensive parentage statute and specified
whom the statute covers.205 As in Philippides, creating a common law
parentage action exceeds the court's authority to modify legislative
policy decisions.
197. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.10.010-.913; see also In re Custody of Stell, 56 Wash. App.
356, 365, 783 P.2d 615, 620 (1989) (finding that a de facto parent can be awarded custody under
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10).
198. See In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 20, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (1998) (recognizing
potential for harm where a substantial relationship is severed), affd on other grounds sub nom.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion); In re Dependency of J.H., 117 Wash. 2d
460, 469, 815 P.2d 1380, 1384 (1991) (noting that Washington courts have recognized the
importance of the bond between nonparent caretakers and children); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108
Wash. 2d 299, 310-11, 738 P.2d 254, 261-62 (1987) (recognizing a bond between child and two
putative fathers); In re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash. App. 637, 649, 626 P.2d 16, 23 (1981)
(recognizing the bond between a child and stepmother).
199. Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 20, 969 P.2d at 30.
200. In re Parentage ofL.B., 121 Wash. App. 460, 488-90, 89 P.3d 271, 285-86 (2004).








C. Lesbian De Facto Parents Have Appropriate Statutory Remedies
and Division I Cannot Override the Legislature's Policy Decision
Given the remedies available under the nonparental custody and
visitation statute, the public policy arguments advanced by Division I are
insufficient to justify a new cause of action. To justify such an action,
the court would need a "clear mandate of public policy. '20 6 The
difficulties in balancing the rights of legal parents, de facto parents, and
children, however, obfuscate the public policy of creating a new
207parentage action. The actual detriment standard used by Washington
courts to address petitions under the nonparental custody and visitation
statute represents a careful balance between the rights of involved
208parties. As long as visitation orders are sufficient to remedy the
identified risk of harm to the child, a court should not create an entirely
new cause of action simply because the court believes it is better policy.
Because the court identified the prevention of harm to children as the
relevant public policy, 20 9  the court should have interpreted the
nonparental custody and visitation statute as an adequate remedy for
those parties, including same-sex couples, excluded from the UPA and
marriage statutes. Using a visitation order to protect the de facto parental
relationship is consistent with the Wisconsin court's approach in H.S.H.-
K., the case on which Division I modeled its test. 210 The Wisconsin court
limited its de facto doctrine to visitation and deemed visitation sufficient
to protect the child's best interests, as well as parental autonomy and
206. In re Parentage of L.B, 121 Wash. App. 460, 476 n.2, 89 P.3d 271, 279 n.2 (2004).
207. See In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 24, 969 P.2d 21, 32 (1998) (Talmadge, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that the court must balance the interests of the child,
legal parent, and state before awarding visitation), affd on other grounds sub nom. Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion); In re Custody of Nunn, 103 Wash. App. 871, 884,
14 P.3d 175, 182 (2001) (reasoning that between a parent and a nonparent a more stringent
balancing test is required); In re Custody of Anderson, 77 Wash. App. 261, 264, 890 P.2d 525, 526-
27 (1995) (holding that in a custody dispute between parents and nonparents, the analysis must
accommodate the natural parent's constitutional interests); In re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash. App.
637, 646, 626 P.2d 16, 22 (1981) (balancing parental rights, state interests, and child's interests to
determine when a nonparent may be awarded custody).
208. Allen, 28 Wash. App. at 649, 626 P.2d at 23.
209. L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 481, 89 P.3d at 282; see also In re Custody of R.R.B., 108 Wash.
App. 602, 616, 31 P.3d 1212, 1219 (2001) ("[lI]n a nonparental custody proceeding, the child's
safety, welfare, growth or development is always at issue; otherwise, there is no basis for awarding
custody to a nonparent."); Smith, 137 Wash. 2d at 15-16, 969 P.2d at 28 ("[Tjhe state may step in
and override a decision of a parent where the decision would harm the child.").




constitutional rights.2 1 1 As the court noted in In re Parentage of L.B., a
custody or visitation order under the existing nonparental statute allows
a de facto parent to maintain a relationship with the child as long as the
de facto parent can demonstrate that severing contact will cause
detriment to the child.21 2 This approach carefully balances the legal




Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals exceeded its
authority in creating a common law parentage cause of action. Thus, the
Washington State Supreme Court should reverse the Division I's
decision in In re Parentage of L.B. The UPA's exclusivity clause
preempts a court from creating a common law parentage cause of action.
Even if the UPA were not the exclusive means of determining parentage,
the UPA, adoption, and nonparental custody statutes create a statutory
framework that preempts common law remedies. This does not,
however, invalidate Division I's concern with protecting the best
interests of the child. The court should defer to the legislature's policy
decision to address this situation outside the context of the UPA. Thus,
the Washington State Supreme Court should affirm Division I's
alternative holding that same-sex de facto parents have a remedy under
the nonparental custody statute.
211. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419,436 (Wis. 1995).
212. L.B., 121 Wash. App. at 489-90, 89 P.3d at 286.
213. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
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